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ARGUMENT
I.

FIRST AMERICAN'S PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS FAIL.
Ignoring standards of review and arguing facts, First American advances four

main points, repeating them ad nauseam in its cram-spaced brief:
A.
B.
C.

The Assessment alone caused Vestin's injury;
The Policies pre-dated the injury;
The authorities all support First American's position; and

D.

The granting of Vestin's certiorari petition limits the arguments.

Vestin responds to each in turn. None is accurate.
A.

Injury and Causation Are Issues of Fact

A 12(b)(6) motion is not well taken if any set of facts could support the cause of
action. Christensen v. Lelis Automatic Transmission Serv., 467 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah
1970). Reviewing this threshold motion, the Court cannot simply accept First
American's ipse dixit assertions of Vestin's injury and its cause based on a narrow
reading of the Complaint. The Court must presume Vestin's facts are true and view them
liberally in their most favorable light. See St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.,
811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991) (dismissal); Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful
City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1990) (summary judgment).
Given this standard, Vestin has viable grounds for proceeding. (R. 1-10; Opening
Br.; infra.) Initial pleadings need not set forth all the particulars of a party's legal
position. "[A] complaint is required only to give the opposing party fair notice of the
nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation
involved." Christensen, 467 P.2d at 607. Vestin did this: "Despite demand, First

American has refused to pay the claim of Vestin owing under the Policies of Title
Insurance, which constitutes a breach of the Policy by First American. . . . As a result of
the breach of the Policy by First American, Vestin and its assignees have been damaged
in an amount of. . . not less than $2,241,348.70." (R. 10, Aplt. App. 1.) These
allegations from Vestin5s complaint are more than sufficient pleading. See Gill v. 77mm,
720 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Utah 1986).
Ultimately, the Utah courts provide recovery for damages suffered when an
insurer fails to disclose a title defect. Espinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 346, 347
(Utah 1979). Related injury and causation are issues of fact "triable somewhere else than
on summary judgment." Russell v. Hooper Irrigation Co., 435 P.2d 294, 296 (Utah
1967); King v. Searle Pharma, 832 P.2d 858, 864 (Utah 1992). First American played a
role in causing Vestin damage; the fact-finder can determine the extent.
Vestin does not argue the sole cause of injury was the post-Policy lien - that is
First American's rhetoric. (Aplee. Br. at 19, passim) That the due-on-sale provision
played a part in the sale failing does not mean it was the sole or even the principal cause
of the damage alleged in the Complaint. (Aplee. Br. at 27.) "[CJausation issues are
factual issues that generally cannot be resolved as a matter of law. We refuse to prevent
these issues from going to the jury when, as here, there is any evidence upon which a
reasonable jury could infer causation." Nay v. General Motors Corp., GMC Truck Div.,
850 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). Certainly a court should not
summarily dismiss based on First American }s argumentative characterizations. See, e.g.,
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Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1990)
(facts and inferences viewed in light most favorable to non-moving party).
This Court accords no deference to the ruling below. Brigham Young Univ. v.
Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, \ 13, 110 P.3d 678. If there is any doubt about
the propriety of a dismissal motion, it should not be granted. King v. Searle Pharma.,
832 P.2d 858, 864 (Utah 1992). First American's technical assertions regarding divisible
injury and cause transpose the appropriate analysis. Reversal is required here.
B.

The SID Documents Pre-Date Policy No. 3192 and the Endorsements.

Vestin gives an accurate timeline of events in its opening brief. (Opening Br. at 78, 10-11.) The Eagle Mountain SID Documents pre-date Policy No. 3192 and both
Endorsements. The treatise relied on by both parties holds the endorsement date controls
liability for events between the date of policy and the endorsement:
When, however, the insurer expressly consents to a general endorsement of
a policy, the date of the endorsement controls the liability of the
insurer. Defects in title falling within the scope of the endorsement and
arising between the original date of the policy and the date of the
endorsement are covered by the policy thereafter. The insurer has the
duty to search the title for defects discoverable on the land records filed
between those dates before issuing the endorsement. . . . As to the subject
of any endorsement for some special coverage, the date of the
endorsement should control the date of issuance of the policy as to a
claim made under the special coverage. . . .
Barlow Burke, Law of Title Insurance § 3.03, at 3-51 (3rd ed. 2004) (emphasis added).
Coverage thus exists for Vestin under both Policies.
The Form 104 Endorsements say they do not "extend" the "effective date" of the
Policies or of any other endorsement. (R. 24, 44.) This means adopting these

1/11.1 IACM-1,,1

O

Endorsements does not "lengthen," "prolong," or "add to" the time the Policies are in
effect. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 411 (10th ed. 1999). It does not mean
the original policy date measures liability for events occurring before the endorsement
date. (Aplee. Br. at 15-16.) The undefined "effective date" is not synonymous with the
defined "Date of Policy" start date. (R. 80, 84, 100, 104); see Hansen v. Wilkinson, 658
P.2d 1216, 1217 (Utah 1983) ("[0]rdinarily when people say one thing they do not mean
something else."). Reference to "extending" endorsements would otherwise be
nonsensical. See Okelberry v. W. Daniels Land Ass 'n, 2005 UT App 327, ^f 24 (contract
will not be construed to reach absurd result). If there is any question, this is at least
ambiguous and therefore factual. See infra part III.B.
The record is silent on the precise dates First American issued the Endorsements.
Discovery will establish this and other facts crucial to the parties' respective positions.
The Court should not dismiss beforehand.
C.

The Record In This Case Requires Reversal.

First American overstates the weight and effect of the authorities. They neither
uniformly nor unanimously support First American. This Court judges cases on their
individual merits; it does not blindly follow string cites.
The coverage in Edwards v. St. Paul Title Ins. Co., 563 P.2d 979 (Colo. App.
1977), specifically excluded "Taxes and assessments not yet due or payable and Special
Assessments not yet certified to the Treasurer's office." Id. at 980. Little wonder, then,
the intermediate Colorado court found no liability for "the mere existence of the district
and the prospect of taxes in the future." Id. There is no similar exclusion in this case.
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Moreover, Eagle Mountain did more than simply create a special district as in Edwards:
it actually decided to assess, resolved objections, adopted and recorded an ordinance, and
notified the public of impending assessments, all before the Endorsement clauses and the
second Policy went into effect. (R. 121-123, 127-143.)
Strass v. District-Realty Title Ins. Corp., 358 A.2d 251 (Md. Sp. App. 1976), held
pre-lien assessment decisions were "encumbrances" if "inevitable." Id. at 258. In the
instant case, the Notice of Intention said improvements "shall be paid by special
assessments to be levied against the property." (R. 121, emphasis added.) In a section
titled "Levy of Assessments" the Notice said, "The assessments shall be levied
according to the benefits to be derived by each property within the District." (R.
122, emphasis added.) The Assessment was in fact levied directly. (R. 335-345.)
Adopting Strass's approach and viewing the evidence favorably to Vestin, a jury could
find the Eagle Mountain Assessment was inevitable.
Strass labored to distinguish Manor Real Estate Co. v. Jos. M. Zamoiski Co., 246
A.2d 240 (Md. 1968). In Manor, Maryland's highest court properly rejected the very
argument First American makes, that coverage is invoked only if an "encumbrance" has
first ripened into a "lien":
Manor further declares that "if the future charges are encumbrances, it is
only because they are first liens," which seems to us to be another way of
saying that unless an encumbrance is also a lien it cannot be an
encumbrance. But there are many encumbrances, such as easements, that
are not liens. As Judge Carter put it "a lien is always an encumbrance, but
an encumbrance need not necessarily be a lien."
It has been said that the mere fact that property becomes liable for the
payment of a benefit charge for municipal improvements may constitute an

encumbrance even before the amount thereof has been ascertained. 4 H.
Tiffany, The Law of Real Property § 1003, n.3 at 135 (3d ed. 1939). It has
been said also that present liability to an eventual lien may be sufficient to
establish an encumbrance. 20 Am.Jur.2d, Covenants § 87 (1965).
Id. at 242-43, 245. The Manor court cited approvingly an earlier decision from
Massachusetts' highest court finding a pre-lien encumbrance when "[t]here was a liability
which was sure to become absolute and enforceable against the land as soon as the work
was completed and the expense ascertained. This was an incumbrance from which the
plaintiffs were entitled to be protected under the covenant" Id. at 247 (quoting Cotting v.
Commonwealth, 91 N.E. 900, 902 (Mass. 1910)) (emphasis modified). These cases, like
Strass, confirm liability is soundly based on failure to disclose assured forthcoming
assessments.
Other cases First American cites, however, contradict these cases, confuse
encumbrances with liens - as so many cases do - and reach unsustainable holdings.
(Aplee. Br. at 31 n.19.) Butcher v. Burton Abstract & Title Co., 216 N.W.2d 434, 436
(Mich. App. 1974), for example, acknowledged "the broadest definition of the word
'encumbrance' might include prospective charges." Butcher nevertheless held a special
assessment must be a "lien" before it is an "encumbrance." This same court subsequently
found statutory use of the word "encumbrance" to be ambiguous given post-Butcher
cases applying its broader meaning. See Lakes of the N. Ass 'n v. Twiga P 'ship, 614
N.W.2d 682, 685-86 (Mich. App. 2000).
Cummins v. United States Life Ins. Co., 357 N.E.2d 975, 976 (N.Y. 1976), is one
of a string of New York cases perpetuating the error that "'[ejncumbrance' is
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synonymous with 'lien' . . . . " Inavest Enters, v. TRW Title Ins., Inc., 573 N.Y.S.2d239,
242 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (discussing Cummins); see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Union
Trust Co., 27 N.E. 2d 225, 227 (N.Y. 1940) (same); Mayers v. Van Schaick, 197 N.E. 296
(N.Y. 1935) (same). The oft-cited foundational decision in Mayers v. Van Schaickheld
an assessment was not an encumbrance or defect even though it had already been
assessed. 197 N.E. at 296 (1935). Even First American does not argue as much. These
cases are not only demonstrably wrong, they contradict Strass's holding. Moreover, they
allow First American to suggest there are numerous supporting authorities when in fact
the vast majority reflect the decisions of only one state. (Aplee. Br. at 31 n.19); see
Burke § 3.05[A], at 3-76.1 (noting New York provides much of the case law). In the
only soundly reasoned opinion among the incestuous New York cases, the Mayers
dissent pointed out: "It is not necessary that the objection or requirement should amount
to a lien, but what is stated in the policy of title insurance is that any defect is insured
against except those noted." 197 N.E. at 298 (emphasis added).1
Medeiros v. Guardian Title & Guar. Agency, Inc., 387 N.E.2d 644 (Ohio App.
1978), construed a contract requiring the seller to pay for any special assessments
"certified" with the county auditor at the time title transferred. Id. at 645. The court
easily held a subsequent special assessment was not "certified" by the policy date. Id. at

1

Only "liens" were covered in Cole v. Home Title Guar. Co., 29 A.D.2d 552 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1967), affd, 244 N.E.2d 470 (N.Y. 1968). This unremarkable holding was correct
on its facts. First American puffs its authorities by citing this inapposite New York case
twice. (Aplee. Br. at 31 n.19.)

647. Despite First American's aspersions, cases construing limitations in conveyances
are analogous to title insurance cases - and are included in First American's citations.
Lastly, First American inexplicably cites Burman v. Richmond Homes, Ltd., 821
P.2d 913, 921 (Colo. App. 1991) - a case that very much supports Vestin. Burman relied
specifically on an affidavit identifying Colorado's custom and practice for disclosing
special improvement districts. Id. at 921. Vestin has submitted just such (unrebutted)
evidence showing the governing custom and practice here - which is to disclose special
improvement districts. (R. 355-361, 396-397.) Furthermore, the record in Burman
showed the defendant did disclose the district in the title commitments and policies. 821
P.2d at 913. Vestin itself could not have picked a better case.
Notably, most if not all of First American's cases enforce assessment statutes. A
priori, this Court should enforce Utah's assessment statute, which requires recording of
pre-lien SID assessment documents that create an "encumbrance" on title. Utah Code
Ann. § 17A-3-307(6).
The treatises add little, if anything, to the weight of the authorities. Burke,
Palomar, Couch, and AmJur cite and then discuss the reasoning from the same cases cited
by First American. Virtually all the major points First American makes about the state of
the law are derived in this way. (Aplee. Br. at 23, 25,31, 46-47.) This no more
demonstrates unanimous opinion among the jurisdictions than the cases themselves.
These same authorities admit the question here is a factual one. See, e.g., 43 Am. Jur. 2d
Insurance § 526 (2002) ("What constitutes a defect in title, or a lien or encumbrance
thereon, depends upon the facts of the individual case."); Couch on Insurance 3d
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§ 159:38 (1998) (when assessment maybe considered to exist "is generally a factual
question requiring analysis of all laws, ordinances, and regulations concerning the
authority to levy the specific assessment that is in dispute").
First American tries to distinguish Bel-Air Motel Corp. v. Title Ins. Corp., 444
A.2d 1119 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1981), on grounds the improvements had been completed.
(Aplee. Br. at 33 n.20.) The court held, however, "the local improvement ordinance itself
created a title defect" because of state title search legislation. 444 A.2d at 1122. Like
Bel-Air, Lafferty v. Milligan, 30 A. 1030 (Pa. 1895), was held to be a sufficiently definite
encumbrance because an existing statute made the improvement an encumbrance even
though a lien had not yet attached. See id. at 1031. These cases are both analogous here,
where the Utah Legislature has required recording of the local improvement ordinance as
an encumbrance in the county real property records where title insurers search. Utah
Code Ann. § 17A-3-307(6).
Bel-Air's analysis is cogent, extensive, and worthy of review and emulation, both
on the coverage and recorded police power exception issues. See infra part II. No
decision contradicting Bel-Air has come down from any high court within the last 25
years. This Court has a virtual tabula rasa on which to decide a leading case to guide
other jurisdictions in this century. The Court should take advantage of supervening
scholarship that has properly defined defects and encumbrances as different than liens.
Moreover, the Court should apply Utah's statutory scheme. The Court should not
mindlessly regurgitate holdings such as those First American cites, especially those based
on faulty premises exposed by actually reading the cases.

Vestin's case law stands for the propositions cited and is the better reasoned. To
quote Leh v. Burke and the cases it relies on:
Encumbrance is a broad term and has been defined as "'every right or
interest in the land which may subsist in third persons to the diminution of
the value of the land, but consistent with the passing of the fee by the
conveyance.5" Ritter v. Hill, 282 Pa. 115, 118, 127 A. 455, 456 (1925),
quoting from Lafferty v. Milligan, 165 Pa. 534, 537, 30 A. 1030, 1031
(1895). It may be either "one which affects the physical condition or use of
the property, or one which affects the title of the property." Ziskind v.
Bruce Lee Corp., 224 Pa.Super. 518, 521, 307 A.2d 377, 379 (1973).
Examples of encumbrances have been said to include assessable benefits
which have not yet become liens, Ritter v. Hill supra . . . .
331 A.2d 755, 762 (Pa. 1974). In Ritter v. Hill, the court concluded planned
improvements constituted an encumbrance. 127 A. at 456. Construing this term to
include all claims which affect market value, the court concluded the conveyance
breached a covenant against encumbrances, even though the parties did not know
precisely when, if ever, the land would be occupied. Id. at 457; see Lafferty, 30 A. at
1031-32 (same).
Finally, and separately, the record in the instant case must be considered. This
Court should take into account the threshold procedural posture; the allegations; the
affidavit evidence; and First American's parallel disclosure of this and other special
improvement districts. Given this record, it was legal error to dismiss, notwithstanding
the holding of any other case. See also infra part II. A (discussing Utah legislative
scheme).
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D.

Vestin's Arguments Each Support the Certiorari Issue.

Vestin's arguments fall squarely within the purview of the certiorari review. This
Court should consider whether it is reviewing a summary judgment or 12(b)(6) dismissal.
(Opening Br., part II.A & B.) It should also examine contract law and public policy,
giving thought to the impact on Vestin and similarly situated parties. (Opening Br., part
II.C.) Controlling legal principles are woven throughout these discussions.
The Court should also decide whether the Eagle Mountain SID documents
constituted a "recorded encumbrance" on Vestin's title as the Legislature said in Utah
Code Ann. § 17A-3-307(6) (c). This case from the outset has involved application of the
Utah Municipal Improvement District Act, Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-301, et seq. (R. 71,
236-37, 415.) This Court's review of legislation is "plenary," with all that word denotes.
Covington v. Board of Review, 737 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1987). As the U.S. Supreme
Court observed, "We do not construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a
whole." United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984).
In Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165, 168 & n.3 (Utah 1992), this Court
sua sponte identified, analyzed, and applied a controlling statute that was not raised to or
considered by the district court. Here as there, prudential appellate maxims should not
undermine the overarching objective to render a correct decision on an issue directly
addressed by the lawmaking branch. See id. (holding it would be "contrary to public
policy" to ignore statute on point).
Neither plain error nor extraordinary circumstances are needed to consider the
statute. The underlying defect argument raised below is the same argument Vestin

advances now. Vestin highlighted its "new argument" for the Court out of an abundance
of caution. On appeal, parties are not (and should not be) prevented from identifying
additional law to elucidate the issues. Statutory law differs in kind from case law only in
that it trumps in a conflict. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2. This Court's dictums on
appellate review have consistently focused on preventing the wholesale raising of brand
new issues, not on stifling the identification of additional legal authority that helps decide
the proper outcome of the issues on review. See, e.g., Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004
UT 98,143, 104 P.3d 1208; Aplee. Br. at 35 n.21.
The statute is highly relevant - it could not be more on point - and if it employs a
"slightly cavalier use" of the word "encumbrance," it does so in precisely the same
context as the Policies with respect to the publicly recorded documentation at issue.
(Aplee. Br. at 38.) If "encumbrance" here does not mean "encumbrance" there, an
ambiguity exists. See, e.g., Lakes of the N. Ass 7?, 614 N.W.2d at 685-86 (holding
statutory reference to "encumbrance" was ambiguous in light of differing case law
usages); infra part III.B (ambiguity analysis). That First American identifies two
separately acceptable constructions of a word not defined in the Policies makes ambiguity
all the more apparent.
An encumbrance can include "any right in a third party which diminishes the
value or limits the use of the land granted." Magraw v. Dillow, 671 A.2d 485 (Md. 1996)
(citing 3 American Law of Property § 12.128 (1952) (emphasis added)). This definition
is not synonymous with "lien" and the statute does not make it so. (Aplee. Br. at 39
n.24.) "[W]hen reading a statute, we presume that the legislature used each word
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advisedly." Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, \ 11, 61 P.3d 989. If "encumbrance"
meant "lien" in the statute, a lien would arise on the filing of the Notice of Intention. See
Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-307(6).
In sum, none of First American's principal arguments is right.
II.

THE POLICIES AND ENDORSEMENTS PROVIDE COVERAGE.
A.

Vestin's Title Had a "Defect" and Was "Unmarketable."
1.

First American Failed to Disclose a "Defect" in Vestin's Title.

The recorded Eagle Mountain SID documents were evidence of a sufficient
"claim" against title to constitute a defect and require disclosure in Utah. This is best
demonstrated by the statutory scheme.
Municipalities create special districts to improve real property pursuant to the
Municipal Improvement District Act, Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-301, et seq. Notice of
intent must be given to the public and an opportunity to object provided. Id. § 17A-3-305
to -307. After considering all protests, the governing body creating the district must
record the final approved resolution in the County Recorder's office, identifying the
"legal description and tax identification number of each property to be assessed." Id.
§ 17A-3-307(6)(a)(i). If additional properties are added, a new recording must be filed in
the County Recorder's office. Id. § 17A-3-307(6)(b). If the governing body deletes any
properties to be assessed after the district has been created, it must "record a release and
discharge of the recorded encumbrance created as a result of the recording required by
this section." Id. § 17A-3-307(6)(c) (emphasis added). The district then contracts for

improvements and levies assessments. Id. § 17A-3-308 to-312. An assessment becomes
a lien when the assessment is levied. Id. § 17A-3-323.
In light of this comprehensive statute and its modernizing purposes, see id. § 17A3-302, the reasons First American gives for not disclosing the "recorded encumbrance"
are inapplicable. (Aplee. Br. at 25-26.) Vestin responds to each:
u

•

[I]n some jurisdictions, local legislative history for tax bills is just too
unreliable.... Local legislative records are neither uniformly nor sufficiently
maintained to enable insurers to perform such searches well." Burke § 3.05[A], at
3-77. Not so under the Utah statute, which requires recording of the key
documents. First American found the Eagle Mountain SID in the county records
and excepted it when issuing a title policy to another purchaser. (R. 396-97.)

•

"Taxpayers might object." Under Utah's statute, recording is not required until
after protests are heard. See Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-306 to -07.

•

"There may be an error in the political process." There may also be invalidating
errors in recorded liens. This is hardly justification for not disclosing what is
required by law to be recorded as an encumbrance against specific property.

•

"An alternate source of funding may be found." Burke himself all but rebuts this
justification in explaining the purpose for which policyholders purchase insurance:
The purpose of title insurance is to protect a transferee of real
estate from possible losses through defects that may cloud
title. The prospective real estate purchaser relies on the title
insurer's search when he decides whether or not to purchase
the property; accordingly, he expects the insurer (1) to have
researched the applicable law, as well as the records, before
issuing the commitment, and (2) to provide warnings about
areas in which he might find title surprises. Burke, §
3.05[A], at 3-85 & n.291 (emphasis added, citations omitted).

•

"Notices of intent might not provide an accurate estimate of the amount of the
planned levy." Burke § 3.05[A], at 3-76.2 to 3-78. This fails on its own merits as
a compelling reason. Many encumbrances appearing of record do not carry a
dollar amount at all. The purpose of recording has never been to liquidate claims
but to warn of potential exposure.
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Burke's arguments are more a justification for when a legislature, as a matter of
statutory policy, should conclude a lien arises. But the Policies are not limited to liens.
The Utah Legislature required the "encumbrance" at issue here be recorded in the very
place where title companies search. See 1 Joyce Palomar, Title Insurance Law §5:5
(county real property records are "the only public records the title insurer is obligated to
search"). The law in Utah - which was modernized deliberately - is different from other
jurisdictions where authorization for special assessments is generally not filed in county
real property records. See id. Given this law, summary dismissal is most inappropriate.
See Oak Park Tr. & Savings Bk. v. Intercounty Title Co. of III, 678 N.E.2d 723, 725-27
(111. App. Ct. 1997) (whether an estimate of unpaid taxes was a public record requiring
disclosure by an insurer was not appropriate for determination on summary judgment).
First American claims it could not negotiate premiums if it had to disclose
publicly recorded SID documents. (Aplee. Br. at 27.) This Court has more faith in the
market than that. Vestin is not asking for a guaranty or warranty. (Aplee. Br. at 49.)
Vestin wants only what First American obligated itself to do: indemnify for "on-record
and off-record defects found in the title or interest in an insured property to have existed
on the date on which the policy is issued." (Aplee. Br. at 49, quoting Burke.) Vestin
bargained for and is entitled to this. It asks for nothing more. First American and other
title companies need only disclose what industry custom and practice say they should.
"Defect" is a broad term encompassing any adverse impact on title. United Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Fidelity Title Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 714, 719 (8th Cir. 2001). Utah cases have
identified numerous "defects" under a wide variety of circumstances. See, e.g., Neves v.

Wright, 638 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1981) (seller did not own property during entire executory
period of contract); Castagno v. Church,, 552 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1976) (buyer ordered to
stop pumping water from conveyed land by state engineer); Bott v. Reeder, 369 P.2d 932
(Utah 1962) (subject land in probate estate); Stewart v. Lesin, 302 P.2d 714 (Utah 1956)
(restriction on transfer of franchise accompanying auto sales business); Kiahtipes v.
Mills, 649 P.2d 9 (Utah 1982) (junior lienholder). This is helpful Utah precedent from
which to mold the rule of decision here.2
Vestin has pointed out the term "defect" is meaningless if a "lien" is required.
(Opening Br. at 18-19.) First American argues "encumbrance" is meaningless if a
"defect" is enough. (Aplee. Br. at 36-37.) This is a prototypical ambiguity scenario. See
infra part IILB.
Finally, First American argues that because the terms of payment were not known
until after the assessment ordinance, Vestin was harmed only because of the due-on-sale
requirement. (Aplee. Br.,passim.) This is not true. Utah's statutory scheme, in place
since 1990, holds property owners liable for the full amount of an assessment regardless
of installment payment requirements. See Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-323. Moreover,
following First American's reasoning to its logical extreme, there would be no actual
2

First American's own list of defects, taken from Palomar's treatise and Utah case law, is
facially incomplete. (Aplee. Br. at 23 n.13); see Palomar § 5.5, text accompanying
nn.10-11 (identifying Bel-Air holding as one type of defect and encumbrances such as
"easement[s]" as another).
3
"[CJourts tend to use the terms ["defect," "lien," and "encumbrance"] loosely and
interchangeably in cases pertaining to title insurance coverage." Palomar § 5.5, at 5-19
(emphasis added); cf. Aplee. Br. at 30 n.18. This does not mean courts should. That they
do is a problem, not a rationale. See also Manor Real Estate, 246 A.2d at 245 (lamenting
"the tendency of the courts to equate or confuse liens with encumbrances").
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harm until foreclosure. At this stage of the proceedings, Vestin gets the benefit of the
doubt on all such arguments.
2.

Vestin's Title Was "Unmarketable."

Even if no defect exists, title may be unmarketable if a reasonable buyer with
knowledge of all the facts would be deterred from accepting the title. See Bel-Air, 444
A.2d at 1122-23. In Bel-Air, the court held the plaintiffs title unmarketable because the
plaintiff would be exposed to litigation concerning its title if it challenged the assessment
or pressed a claim against its vendor based on the assessment. Id. Vestin was in
precisely that predicament.
First American overlooks Vestin itself as a purchaser in arguing the title was
marketable. Vestin would have structured the transactions differently or not purchased at
all had it known of the impending assessment. (R. 360.) In this sense, what Vestin
would have done had the SID documents been disclosed is not "irrelevant." (Aplee. Br.
at 17-18 n.7.) Moreover, Vestin alleges its buyer actually failed to perform because of
the previously undisclosed SID itself. (R. 9.)
That the SID's intent to assess affected Vestin's title is evidenced by its recording
against the property in the County Recorder's office. This occurred before the second
Policy and the Endorsements issued and raises at least a substantive question of fact. See
Mellinger v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. ofCa., 113 Cal Rptr. 2d 357, 360 (Cal. App. 2001)
(unmarketability is factual).
Finally, unmarketability is determined "without reference to the beneficial
purpose" creating the restriction. George v. Colvin, 219 P.2d 64 (Cal. App. 1950)

243 316943vl

17

(quoting 57 A.L.R. 1414). "It is no defense to show by the opinion of experts that the
value of the property is not diminished by the restrictions." Id. This issue should clearly
move forward.
B.

The Existence of the SID Made Incorrect First American's
Representations.

First American says the Eagle Mountain SID and intended assessment "could not"
cut off, subordinate, or otherwise impair Vestin's lien at the time of the second Policy.
(Aplee. Br. at 42.) They most certainly could, and did. Coverage was provided for any
condition capable of impairing Vestin's interest. It was wholly unnecessary for the
"covenants, conditions, or restrictions" to have already subordinated, impaired, or cut off
Vestin's interest. This would make the "incorrectness" provision superfluous: the
Policies would need only provide coverage for already existing liens. The Utah appellate
courts do not interpret contracts this way. See Kraatz v. Heritage Imps., 2003 UT App
201, U 26, 71 P.3d 138 (court will not interpret contract to have superfluous terms).
C.

The Eagle Mountain SID Documents Were "Other Matters" that First
American Failed to Disclose.

First American equates "other matters" with "defects, liens, or encumbrances."
(Aplee. Br. at 43.) But in the Policies, "other matters" does not come at the end of a list
of specific items that includes defects, liens, or encumbrances. Instead, it comes in a
separate clause insuring against the existence of matters "other than those shown in the
policy." (R. 111, emphasis added.) The doctrine of ejusdem generis applied in
Lombardo v. Pierson, 852 P.2d 308 (Wash. 1993), does not control. (Aplee. Br. at 43
n.26.) To the contrary, the rules of contract law dictate construing the "other matters"
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clause to have significance independent of the other insuring clauses. See, e.g., Stewart
Title Guar. Co. v. Greenlands Realty, L.L.C., 58 F. Supp. 2d 370, 382 (D.N.J. 1999).
First American tries to turn Vestin's arguments around, suggesting the "subsisting
tax or assessment lien" language is surplusage if a "defect" is enough. (Aplee. Br. at 34.)
These items appear in different provisions altogether. Had First American missed an
existing lien, it undoubtedly would have been liable. But if First American meant only to
exclude liens, it could have limited its Policies to that language.
The steps taken to assess Vestin's property were "matters" completed and
recorded that merited disclosure. Claims based on such grounds are fact-intensive:
A claim based on a tax lien is not usually susceptible to resolution at the
summary judgment stage. This is so because the complexities of assessing
the lien will not likely be resolved without testimony from the insurer's [or
the insured's] personnel, who are familiar with both the mechanics of
assessment and the underwriting of the policy.
Burke § 3.05[A], at 3-85. Such evidence may include "[e]vidence that the lien was
inchoate, but nonetheless was customarily included in the policy." Id.
First American suggests Vestin would have suffered no injury had it sold the
Property after the SID was created but before a lien attached. (Aplee. Br. at 11-12.)
Whether it even could have after a proper title search is pure speculation. Vestin likewise
would have suffered no injury if its purchaser had completed the sale or if First American
had disclosed the SID documents. These are factual arguments to be supported by
evidence yet to be developed. Vestin suffered injury by purchasing land subject to an
impending assessment that had been statutorily noticed and recorded and against which
Vestin no longer had any statutory right to protest.
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D.

The Police Power Exception Helps Define Coverage,

An exception to an exclusionary clause need not provide independent coverage for
the clause to cover the insured. The insuring agreement defines the type of risks covered;
the exclusions remove coverage; exceptions to such exclusions limit the breadth of those
exclusions. Collin v. American Empire Ins. Co., 21 Cal. App. 4th 787, 802-3 (1994).
It would be pointless to except from exclusion uncovered risks. The very
existence of the exception signals the intention recorded police power actions affecting
real property were included in coverage in the first place. See Big Cottonwood Tanner
Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Utah App. 1987) (contract construed to
give meaning to all provisions). Exceptions to exclusions should be considered when
determining coverage. See Crane v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 485 P.2d 1129 (Cal.
1971).
Here, the recorded police power exception should be considered in determining
the scope of coverage. See Bel-Air, 444 A.2d at 1122. Moreover, the exception should
be construed liberally in determining coverage for Vestin. See Taylor v. American Fire
& Cas. Co., 925 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Utah App. 1996) (exclusionary clauses construed
strictly against insurer); New England Fed. Cr. Union v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 765
A.2d 450 (Vt. 2000); Radovanov v. Land Title Co., 545 N.E. 2d 351, 354-55 (111. App.
1989); Bel-Air, 444 A.2d 1119.4

4

Bel-Air and the other cited cases fully support Vestin's police power argument. Burke's
"rejection" of Bel-Air makes no sense: Burke cites the case as if it were a supporting
authority for the opposite proposition. Burke § 4.02[B], at 4-28 and n.103.
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First American concedes "the Policies cover 'loss or damage5 caused by the
exercise of a governmental police power if a notice of the exercise of the police power
that caused the loss or damage was recorded in the public records on the policy date."
(Aplee. Br. at 44-45.) That is this case. The Assessment was not simply a post-policy
exercise of police power distinct and separate from the pre-policy "steps." It specifically
implements the pre-lien ordinances. (R. 200, 202-03.) This further distinguishes those
authorities relying on Cummins v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co., 357 N.E.2d at 976-77, which
held on its facts that a post-policy lien was a new exercise of legislative authority that did
not relate back to an expired authorization made six years earlier.
In sum, coverage or factual issues about coverage exist under multiple Policy
provisions.
III.

PROPER AMBIGUITY ANALYSIS REQUIRES REVERSAL.
A.

This Court Construes Insurance Policies in Favor of the Insured.

"Since 1921 this Court has expressed its commitment to the principle that
insurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and their
beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance." United States
Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 521-22 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted); see also
McCoy v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 2001 UT 31, n.l, 20 P.3d 901 (same). Only if a
policy is unambiguous does the presumption in favor of coverage disappear. S. W. Energy
Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co., 1999 UT 23,ffif12-14, 974 P.2d 1239. Evidence of
ambiguity keeps the presumption intact, and "all ambiguities are construed against the
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insurer and are 'resolved in favor of coverage.'" Hill v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 888 P.2d
138, 140 (Utah App. 1994) (quotingNielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664, 666 (Utah 1992)).
There is no basis for departing from the settled rules based on First American's
factual characterization of Vestin as "sophisticated." (Aplee. Br. at 19 n.10.) These form
policies should not be applied differently to Vestin, who was in the same position as any
other policyholder purchasing title insurance.
B.

This Court Should Consider the Record Evidence in Determining the
Policies Are Ambiguous,

First American's ambiguity analysis is wrong. That ambiguity is a question of law
does not make extrinsic evidence irrelevant. To the contrary, proffered evidence is
considered. Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass 'n, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995).
This Court recently reaffirmed this analysis. See Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT
37, Tf 7, 78 P.3d 600 (citing Ward inter alia). Yet the Court of Appeals uses this maxim
notoriously selectively. Compare Novell, Inc. v. The Canopy Group, Inc., 2004 UT App
162, If 21, 92 P.3d 768 (citing Ward and looking to extrinsic evidence) with Ct. App. Op.,
Iflf 9, 19 & n.9 (suggesting court may only consider extrinsic evidence after finding
contract ambiguous). This breeds unfairness and confusion. Indeed, inconsistency of
this sort contributed to the Tenth Circuit's believing "Utah law is unsettled on the issue
whether the court may go beyond the four corners of the contract to determine whether
the contract is ambiguous." Flying J, Inc. v. Comdata Network, Inc., 405 F.3d 821, 831
(10th Cir. 2005). Ultimately, however, the Tenth Circuit applied Ward because Utah
counsel recognized it governed. See id. at 832.
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This Court should affirm the Ward rule unequivocally. Parties and their counsel in
Utah are entitled to consistent application of one rule - not differing rules reaching
different results in comparable contexts.
Vestin's extrinsic evidence is compelling. First American's litigation position
contradicts industry practice and First American's own practice. (R. 359, 396-97.) First
American disclosed to Vestin a different SID and revealed the assessment status. (R. 18,
86.) First American also disclosed and excepted this very SID and this very Notice of
Intention to levy special assessments to a different policyholder. (R. 396-97.) Why?
First American plainly determined it was required to do so under its standard policy.
First American also warned Vestin of pre-lien charges and assessments that could be, but
had not yet been, levied by non-SID governmental authority. (R. 18, 86.)5
First American has no answer for this evidence but to malign it without contrary
evidence. First American weakly suggests Vestin's affidavits violate the parol evidence
rule. (Aplee. Br. at 18 n.8.) This evidence demonstrates how the Policy terms are to be
construed, not varied or contradicted. Indeed, First American itself relies on industry
custom and practice in arguing its construction, telling the Court the Policies are
"standard form" documents "used throughout the country" and approved by ALTA.
(Aplee. Br. at 24 & n.14; see also id. at 28.) This evidence, viewed in its most favorable

5

The Eagle Mountain SID is a separate arm of the government from Eagle Mountain
City, with separate power to assess. See Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 226 P.2d 127,
131, 139 (Utah 1950). Consequently, this statement did not disclose the SID or its ability
to levy charges and assessments. (Aplee. Br. at 22 n.12.) Given this language, however,
any reasonable policyholder would be justified in believing entities with assessment
power would be disclosed.
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light to Vestin, cuts against First American. Because the Policies are standard forms,
evidence of how First American generally interprets them demonstrates at least an
ambiguity when First American advances a contradictory position here. See also AIS
Insurance Online Glossary, www.aisinsurance.com/pltp/pages/glossary ("policy jacket"
is preprinted form with standard language).6
First American also relies on matters outside the pleadings, including facts
unsupported by the record. It argues, without record citation, "the improvements
obviously have caused the value of the benefited property to increase." (Aplee. Br. at 3.)
It says Vestin "obviously" will "enjoy" the "benefit" bestowed and wants First American
to "pay for the benefit." (Aplee. Br. at 3.) It relies on the very evidence submitted by
Vestin to argue Vestin's people were experienced and sophisticated. (Aplee. Br. at 19
n.10.) It characterizes Vestin's testimony, calling it "self-serving." (Aplee. Br. at 17
n.7.) These are factual jury-type arguments (or completely unsupported by evidence),
inappropriate for summary dismissal of a non-moving plaintiff at the pleading stage.
First American also says Vestin's neighbors have to pay for their improvements
and Vestin is not bearing its fair share. (Aplee. Br. at 48.) This is completely
unsupported by the record. Perhaps each adjoining landowner had title insurance that
disclosed the Eagle Mountain SID and Notice of Assessment, maybe even from First

6

First American did not put IFA's policy in the record. See Rivera v. TRW Title Ins. Co.,
765 N.Y.S.2d 257 (App. Div. 2003) (affiirming judgment against insurer after trial court
drew negative inference from its failure to present evidence of its underwriting practices).
There is no record basis for First American's suggestion it "negotiated" different policy
language with IFA. (Aplee. Br. at 18 n.7.)
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American. It will be revealing to see what discovery turns up. There is no "windfall" in
a policyholder actually receiving the benefit of the bargain for which it pays premiums.
First American argues Vestin's evidence does not show Vestin or First American
subjectively intended disclosure of the SID or Notice of Assessment. (Aplee. Br. at 17
n.7.) The correct standard is objective, asking what a reasonable purchaser would
anticipate. See, e.g., Christensen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 443 P.2d 385, 387 (Utah 1968).
Vestin's evidence certainly shows this. Even if the standard were subjective, the
evidence shows the parties so intended because: (1) First American and the industry as a
whole typically disclose; and (2) Vestin's officers were familiar with these standards.
"To demonstrate ambiguity, the contrary positions of the parties must each be
tenable." R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Utah 1997).
Given the evidence, Vestin's position is more than tenable - it is most probable. The
construction of disputed contract terms is a question of fact after an evidentiary
ambiguity determination. See Flying J, 405 F.3d at 832 (applying Utah law). The Court
of Appeals erred in prematurely preempting factual findings.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, individually and collectively, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
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